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Abstract 
This paper first studies the emerging requirements of mobile payment system by way of NFC cell phones, etc., in public 
transport, especially the security challenges. Then, a secure credit recharge scheme is proposed to cover these new 
requirements. In the proposed scheme, we make use of a shared secret between the smart card and the server to build a 
mutual authenticated and secret communication path. The paper also analyzes the security aspects of the proposed scheme, 
and the analysis and practices show the scheme could meet the security requirements of mobile payment in public 
transport. 
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1. Introduction 
With the development of wireless telecommunication and hardware technology, mobile phones are 
becoming more and more intelligent and powerful. They can be used to do a lot of work which could only be 
handled by personal computers previously. Among them, mobile payment, with its definition as any 
transaction with monetary value that is conducted via a mobile telecommunications network[1], is one of 
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those having huge potential market attractiveness, and it is becoming a hot spot and getting rapid growth both 
in the community and business in these years, and there is quite a few mobile payment systems proposed[2~8]. 
Near field communication (NFC) is a set of standards for smart phones and similar devices to establish 
radio communication with each other by touching them together or bringing them into close proximity, 
usually no more than a few centimeters. It is a key enabling technology for mobile payment services. Powered 
with NFC features, smart phones could be used in public transport and financial and several other fields to 
achieve better mobile payment service experiences. 
There are several main hardware solutions to power smart phones with NFC features. 
z Embedded Secure Element. NFC radio controller, the secure element and NFC software are all in one 
chip embedded in the NFC phone. The Google Nexus S is one of such phones. 
z SWP with SIM-Card. There is a NFC chip in the NFC phone, using single wire protocol (SWP) for 
connection with SIM/UICC card. The SIM card is the secure environment. This approach is considered the 
most popular at the moment, and that seems more favorable for a carrier. 
z Secure Element on Micro-SD Card. There is a NFC chip in the phone, and it communicates with micro-
SD card. The European Payments Council considers it the quickest way to deploy mobile payment. 
z NFC covers. All the NFC features are in the NFC cover specially made for iPhone [10]. 
z NFC devices using audio port. All the NFC features are in a small device (so called box), and the phone 
communicate with the box through its audio port [11]. 
In big cities, a huge number of people travel by public transport every day. At the same time, smart phone 
is becoming more and more popular among mobile phone users. All these factors make mobile payment could 
play its key role in public transport. In the payment system, user (public transport card holder) makes use of 
the mobile application installed in her NFC phone to communicate with the server system online to achieve 
credit recharge, account balance query, transaction detail query, etc. User could accomplish both online 
consumption and offline consumption by the NFC phone as well. 
In the implementation of phone application, the application has to interact with smart card attached to the 
NFC phone by sending APDU (application protocol data unit) commands. There is a key security challenge, 
i.e. how to authenticate a terminal application before authorizing its interactions with the server system run by 
public transport system operator?  
One possible solution is to make use of asymmetric cryptographic algorithms supported by security chips 
in smart cards. In fact, there is a mobile payment system for merchant micropayments [9], which is built on 
NFC Cover. In their system, they leverage the PKI application features embedded in NFC cover to provide 
mutual authentication during payment transactions. Thus this payment system is based on the PKI capability 
provided by NFC cover. However, due to limited resources and cost consideration, smart card applications in 
most of the above hardware solutions could not support strong authentication algorithms, e.g. PKI RSA 
algorithms. 
In this paper, we propose a new mutual authentication scheme based on a shared secret between the smart 
card and the public transport server system, without the need of intensive asymmetric cryptographic 
computation, and thus is practical for different hardware solutions when implementing mobile payment 
services. Based on this authentication mechanism, we propose a secure credit recharge scheme for public 
transport system. Security analysis and practices show that the proposed scheme is both secure and feasible. 
2. A Secure Credit Recharge Scheme 
The proposed secure credit recharge scheme for public transport system mainly considered in two parts. 
The first part is a new mutual authentication mechanism. This mechanism is based on a shared secret between 
the smart card (client) and the system operator server (server). The second part is the proposed secure credit 
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recharge scheme. The process of credit recharge is completed by the aid of session key which is generated by 
mutual authentication mechanism. 
2.1. A mutual authentication mechanism based on a shared secret 
In the scheme, the client and the server have to share a secret, which will be used as an AES 
encryption/decryption key, in the beginning. 
Generation of secret 
The shared secret is generated during in the process of pre-personalization of smart card, and is stored in 
the key file under the Main File of the transport application in the smart card. 
In public transport field, the pre-personalization is generally executed by smart card supplier. Every 
supplier has its main cryptographic key (Ks) derived from the transport operator’s main cryptographic key 
under some kind of rules. In the course of pre-personalization, the physical number of a smart card is already 
known to the supplier. So the supplier can use its main cryptographic key to encrypt the physical number 
(may include some other information shared between the operator and the supplier) to obtain a new key, i.e. 
the shared secret (secret = {physical_number}_{Ks}). 
At the server side, the operator could also calculate to get this same secret when interacting with a smart 
card. Because it knows about how to compute the smart card supplier’s main cryptographic key, and knows 
the physical number of the smart card as well. 
However, any other parties could not obtain this shared secret even they could obtain the physical number 
of a smart card, because the lack of the main cryptographic key of the supplier. 
Mutual authentication 
Based on the shared secret, client and server can achieve mutual authentication between them as follows 
(Fig.1). 

Fig. 1. Mutual authentication 
z ClientÆServer: The client generates a random number R1, and calculates a hash value as 
H1=Hash(SupplierID || physical_number || R1), then encrypts H1 using AES with the shared secret to get a 
cipher text C1.  After these, it sends {SupplierID, physical_number, R1, C1} to the server. 
z ServerÆClient: On receiving the message from the client, the server will use its related 
cryptographic keys to obtain the corresponding shared secret, and then will decrypt the message to check its 
integrity and validness. If the checking succeeds, the server will generate a random number R2 and calculate a 
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hash value as H2=Hash(SupplierID || physical_number || R2), encrypt H2 using AES with the shared secret to 
get a cipher text C2, and send {R2, C2} to the client. 
z ClientÆServer: The client will use its shared secret to decrypt and verify the message received from 
the client. If successful, it will calculate a session key S=Hash(R1 || R2), generate a new random number R3 
and related hash value H3=Hash(physical_number || R3), encrypt H3 using AES with the session key S to get 
a cipher text C3, and send {R3, C3} to the server. 
z ServerÆClient: The server can also calculate the related session key S, and use it to verify the 
message obtained from the client. If the verification succeeds, the server will send a success message to the 
client. 
After the above four steps, the client and the server complete their mutual authentication, and they also 
negotiate a session key for later communication encryption.  
2.2. Our Secure Credit Recharge Scheme 
After the mutual authentication, the client can start the process of credit recharge over the air using the 
session key S for communication encryption, see Fig. 2. 

Fig. 2. Secure credit recharge scheme 
z ClientÆServer: The phone application interacts with the smart card to obtain its wallet information, 
security related information, and transport operator’s specific information. All these information together with 
the recharge amount are encrypted using session key S and sent to the server. 
z ServerÆClient: After receiving the recharge request data from the client, the server decrypt it with 
session key S and verify its integrity and validness. After a successful verification, the server will then check 
whether the online account of the smart card have enough balance to cover the recharge request. If yes, then 
the server will proceed to generate a response data packet according to ISO 7816 APDU command format as 
well as operator specific information, and send to the client after encrypting the total packet using session key 
S. 
z ClientÆServer: The client decrypts the message for verification and sends the APDU command to the 
smart card for the processing of the credit recharge. After that, the phone application will interact with the 
smart card to get the information about the credit recharge result (success or failure), encrypt it and send it 
back to the server. 
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z Server: On receiving the credit recharge result packet, the server will first decrypt to verify it, and then 
carry out the rest processing procedures to finish the whole process. 
With the help of session key S between the phone application and the server, the communication is 
encrypted and no third party could learn its content. At the same time, the payload packet includes secure data 
packets according to ISO 7816 APDU command, adding another level of security to the scheme. 
3. Security of the scheme and future work 
We now look into the security of the proposed scheme in both mutual authentication protocol and credit 
recharge scheme. 
In the mutual authentication protocol, the security level is basically depended on that of the shared secret 
between the server and the smart card. From the generation of secret, we know that the secret is derived from 
smart card’s physical number together with the main cryptographic key of the smart card supplier using AES 
encryption algorithms. The physical number (the plain text) may be reachable to an adversary, but the 
supplier’s cryptographic key is inaccessible to the adversary.  Based on the strength of AES algorithm, 
without the encryption key, an adversary could not obtain the cipher text given a plan text. After generation, 
the secret is store in the key file under the transport application in the smart card. With the security protection 
of smart card, one could not retrieve this secret and can only use it to encrypt or decrypt data. One may try to 
use brute force method to interact with a smart card to obtain the secret. But this is really quite time-
consuming and nearly impossible when the key length is long enough under the case of smart card. 
In the credit recharge scheme, there are two levels of protection.  Firstly, the communication packets are 
encrypted using a session key, which is negotiated in the process of mutual authentication between the client 
and the server. Secondly, the communication payloads are encapsulated according to the ISO 7816 APDU 
command and thus are encrypted as well. 
Extension and Application 
In a word, the proposed scheme is secure and practical in public transport field. Actually, based on the 
same mutual authentication, we could extend our system to support online consumption using the credit in 
smart card, digital ticketing, marketing, sales, etc.   
Besides public transport, the system could also be extended to apply in a lot of other fields, e.g. financial, 
social security, e-business, government industries, etc. 
For the proposed scheme, we have already built a prototype system and put into practice within a small 
range. From the test, we learned that the system did offer us a good level of security service and was quite 
convenient for card holders in public transport. For the next step, we will enrich our prototype system and put 
it into real production practice providing services to the public. 
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